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1 Executive Summary 
This report exploits newly-available data from the secondary schools admissions process 
to shed light on the ways in which parents’ decision-making when choosing schools, and 
experience of gaining admission to chosen schools, differs in different English cities, and 
for different demographic groups within those cities. 
We show how the data can be used to inform two current themes in education policy: 
Social mobility and the London effect 
Secondary schools in the capital have been shown to outperform schools in the rest of 
England, including other large cities. Children of disadvantaged families appear to do 
particularly well, compared to similar children outside London.  
Among other hypotheses, it has been suggested that the school choices of London’s 
parents may play a role in explaining the effect: if London’s parents are more demanding 
of quality, and more willing to go beyond their local school to seek out high-performing 
schools, this might create competitive market conditions that lead to school improvement 
across the board. Of special interest is the choice behaviour of disadvantaged families in 
London, as the relative success of children in this group may be related to the decisions 
their parents make about their children’s education. 
Comparing London, Manchester, Birmingham, and towns in the Pennines region of 
Northern England, the report asks whether geographical variations in choice behaviour 
can help to explain the apparent variation in the success of education markets, the 
‘London effect’, and the existence of educational ‘cold spots’. The report also investigates 
whether geographical differences remain after accounting for demographic variation. 
School Admissions and equality of access 
One of the main limitations to choice is constrained capacity at good schools. At popular 
schools the number of applications often far exceeds the number of places at the school, 
and some oversubscription criteria must be applied to determine who is allocated a 
place. At the same time, it has been observed that the intakes of some types of popular 
schools tend to be more advantaged, more able, and less ethnically-diverse than their 
local neighbourhoods. 
Competing explanations of this apparent sorting invoke either choices (i.e. parents self-
sort by choosing schools differently), residential sorting (i.e. house prices around popular 
schools drive out less-well-off families) or selection (i.e. admissions policies affect 
different groups differently). 
Hitherto, distinguishing between these competing explanations has been difficult. The 
new data allows us to control for both choices and residential location, to isolate the 
residual effect of admissions policies on the demographic sorting of secondary schools. 
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1.1 Methods 
In addressing these questions, the report focusses on variation along four dimensions: 
• Geography; 
• Disadvantage (Pupil Premium status); 
• Child’s prior academic attainment at primary school; 
• Ethnic group. 
We look for evidence of geographical variation (e.g. a London effect) that persists after 
controlling for the other dimensions. 
Three methods are used in the report. First, descriptive statistics tabulate the 
proportion of children obtaining their preferred school, and the proportions ranking 
different numbers of schools, by location, Pupil Premium, attainment and ethnicity. The 
tables are used to explore the choice behaviour and relative admissions success of 
different groups. 
Second, a statistical choice model is used to estimate the relative weighting of 
academic performance (relative to convenience and other factors) in parental decision-
making, and parents’ willingness to seek out higher-performing schools that may be 
further from the family home. This analysis is also broken down by location, Pupil 
Premium, attainment and ethnicity. 
Finally, we implement a matched case-control design to examine the probability of 
being admitted to a school, having applied for that school. By matching on location, this 
design eliminates the ‘selection by mortgage’ element of admissions, to isolate the ways 
that school admissions practices differentially effect different demographic groups. 
1.2 Results 
We find evidence of demographic variation in both decision-making and outcomes from 
the admissions process, with particularly striking variation between white and minority 
ethnic groups. Some headline findings include: 
• In England 93% of white British families obtain their most-preferred school, 
compared to only 73% of black families and 75% of South Asian1 families. 
                                            
 
1 Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and mixed ethnicities containing any of these. 
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• The difference between Pupil Premium and non-Pupil Premium families is more 
modest: 86% of Pupil Premium eligible families obtain their first choice, compared 
to 89% of non-Pupil Premium families. 
• In London, Manchester and Birmingham we find that families of minority ethnicities 
appear to weigh academic performance more highly than white families in 
choosing a school. For example, black and South Asian parents on average 
travelled more than twice as far as white parents for a similar improvement in the 
school’s average test scores (measured by the percentage of pupils achieving 5+ 
A*-C at GCSE), although this may be partly explained by residential sorting. In the 
Pennines sample, in contrast, families of minority ethnicities appeared to travel a 
shorter distance, on average, for test score improvements than white families. 
• Parents do not always use all of the preferences they are allowed, but families of 
minority ethnicities rank more schools on average than white families. 
• Black families are 68% more likely to choose a Church2 school than white families, 
yet they are significantly less likely to be admitted to a Church school than a 
similar white family living nearby. If a white child and a black child apply for a 
single remaining seat at a Church school in London, the black child is less than 
half as likely to be admitted. We find similar results for other ethnic groups in 
London and other cities. 
• Likewise, a Pupil Premium-eligible child is significantly less likely to be admitted 
into a Church school she applies to, than a similar non-Pupil Premium child living 
nearby. 
After disaggregating variation by demographics, and particularly ethnicity, subtle 
differences between London and the other cities remain, but it is the ethnic variation in 
both choice behaviour and access to schools that stands out. 
1.3 Conclusions 
On the London effect, we find that differences between parental decision-making in the 
Capital and elsewhere can largely be explained by London’s diverse ethnic mix. The 
Capital has a far larger proportion of families belonging to minority ethnic groups than 
Manchester, Birmingham or other areas, and there appear to be differences in the ways 
parents of different ethnic groups choose schools. We do not know whether these 
differences are related to differences in preferences for quality, or differences in access 
to schools, or even differences in residential decision-making. However, whatever the 
causes, these differences do affect aggregate parental demand for academic standards. 
Following a ‘quasi-market’ argument, the greater demand for academic standards in 
                                            
 
2 Church schools are schools having either a Roman Catholic or Church of England denomination. 
9 
London might give schools stronger incentives to compete on quality, which might 
plausibly be one ingredient in explaining the relative success of London’s schools. 
The report cautions against interpreting choices without considering strategic pressures 
on parental decision-making, such as the possibility that parents may feel it is unwise to 
list schools where the child has little chance of admission. Such strategic incentives 
distort the picture that preferences data gives us about parental preferences, and they 
also tend to exaggerate headline estimates of parental satisfaction with their children’s 
allocation (i.e. the percentage allocated to their ‘first choice’ school). 
On admissions practices, the report finds evidence that children of minority ethnicities, 
and disadvantaged (Pupil Premium) children, are less likely to gain a place at 
oversubscribed own admissions authority3 schools, and Church schools in particular. For 
minority ethnic groups such as black families, who are much more likely to choose 
Church schools than white families, the selection effect may have a noticeable effect on 
parents’ satisfaction with the admissions process. 
The causes of these systematic differences in admission probabilities are not clear. One 
possibility is that families from different backgrounds have different expectations with 
respect to the chances of admission to own-admissions authority schools, and Church 
schools in particular. For example, it may be that non-white or disadvantaged families 
underestimate the level of competition for Church school places, and consequently do 
not place as much emphasis on fulfilling religious or other requirements before applying. 
The results do not imply that Church schools are cream-skimming pupils, nor do they 
provide evidence that admissions oversubscription criteria are not being applied 
consistently. However, the results provide strong evidence that differences in the 
composition of Church schools and other types of school cannot be explained entirely by 
parents’ preferences and are, at least in part, due to admissions constraints.   
                                            
 
3 In this report, ‘autonomous’ schools are defined as those schools that act as their own admissions 
authorities. This includes academies, free schools, foundation schools and voluntary aided schools. 
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2 Introduction 
In 2013 the Department began to collect individualised data on parents’ ranked 
preferences from local authorities’ admissions processes. The data has been linked to 
the National Pupil Database, and the linked dataset constitutes a unique opportunity to 
study the ways that parents choose schools, and parents’ diverse experiences of the 
admissions process.  
This report has been commissioned to demonstrate the potential of the linked data to 
inform key areas of the Department’s policy agenda. We focus on two timely themes:   
social mobility and the London effect; and the effect of school admissions arrangements 
on access for different groups of families. 
The report focusses on admissions to secondary schools in 2013, although the linked 
data currently extends to primary and secondary school admissions in 2013 and 2014. 
2.1 Social mobility and the London effect 
In recent years there has been mounting evidence that both academic attainment and 
progress in London are higher than in most other parts of England. The difference in 
performance is particularly stark amongst disadvantaged pupils in London, who 
outperform non-disadvantaged pupils in some other parts of the country. In the light of 
this finding, which has been dubbed ‘the London effect’ (Cook, 2013) there have been 
several accounts put forward to attempt to explain the effect. 
The first set of accounts emphasised the importance of deliberate policy initiatives put in 
place during the early 2000’s, such as the ‘London Challenge’ and ‘Teach First’ initiatives 
and the academies programme (Baars et al., 2014). Other studies suggest that the 
process of improvement in London began before these policies were implemented, and 
credit a more gradual systemic improvement in standards (Blanden et al., 2015). Burgess 
(2014) finds that much of the ‘London effect’ can be explained by the relatively diverse 
ethnic composition of the Capital, and argues that demographics, not policies, play a key 
role in explaining London’s success.  
The report contributes to this literature by examining the extent to which the ‘London 
effect’ and the comparative performance in other English cities, can be explained by the 
structure of education markets. It has been hypothesised that a more effective market 
structure, facilitated by market-based reforms such as the academies programme, may 
play a role in the Capital’s success. That is, differences in the diversity of options 
available to parents, and the way parents choose between those options, may serve to 
drive a competition between schools that drives up standards, and somehow does so 
more effectively in London than in other parts of the country. 
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Allen and Burgess (2010) provide a thorough account of the state of the literature on the 
effectiveness of quasi-market schooling in England. They identify four necessary 
conditions for a quasi-market system to be effective: 
• “Parents must value and be able to correctly identify educational success as a 
school characteristic. 
• “Parental choice must be meaningful and capable of affecting the allocation of 
pupils to schools. 
• “Schools must find it beneficial to be popular and to grow. 
• “The best way for schools to be popular must be to raise the quality of teaching 
and learning, rather than engage in other activities (such as cream-skimming easy 
to teach children).” (Allen and Burgess, 2010; pp. 5—7). 
This report, focussing on the first of these necessary conditions, looks for variation in the 
structure of London’s, and other cities’, markets by examining geographical variation in 
the willingness of families, and particularly disadvantaged families, to seek out high-
performing and effective schools, even if it means travelling further. Related to the 
authors’ second  and fourth conditions, we also consider how parents use admissions 
systems, and whether the design of the admissions system may play a role in the London 
advantage. 
We do not directly address the third condition. It is important to note that constraints in 
capacity, especially in urban school districts where school estates often have little spare 
room for expansion, may curtail the ability of popular schools to grow in response to 
demand. Analysis of differences in actual and potential capacity at demanded schools is 
outside the scope of this report. 
The report pays special attention to variation between different groups of pupils by 
disadvantage (represented by Pupil Premium eligibility), ethnicity and ability. Thus the 
analyses are open to the possibility that some or all findings may be attributable to the 
unique demographic diversity of the Capital. 
2.2 School admissions and equality of access 
It has been observed that the intakes of autonomous4 schools, and Church schools in 
particular, tend to be more socially-advantaged, higher-ability and less ethnically-diverse, 
than the composition of such schools’ local neighbourhoods (Andrews and Johnes, 2016; 
Cantle and Kaufmann, 2016; iCoCo et al., 2017). 
                                            
 
4 In this report, ‘autonomous’ schools are defined as those schools that act as their own admissions 
authorities. This includes academies, free schools, foundation schools and voluntary aided schools. 
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However, it is not easy to disentangle the causes of the apparent stratification in 
autonomous schools, including the majority of Church schools. It is possible that the 
patterns of uneven sorting along socio-economic and ethnic lines merely reflect the 
diverse preferences for Church schools of different groups. Conversely, it is possible that 
for some reason disadvantaged and minority ethnic groups are less able to access 
places at Church and other autonomous schools. 
Allen and West (2011) suggest that the socio-economic profile of Christian families in 
England may explain much of the stratification, since higher-socio-economic groups are 
more likely to identify as Christian. However, they also find that lower-income families 
identifying as Christian are less likely to attend a Church school than more affluent 
families. 
Even if admissions arrangements play a role, this may not be to do with deliberate 
selection. It may be that lower-income groups are less able to access popular schools 
because they are less able to afford houses within the catchment zones of popular 
schools, where house prices have been driven up by demand for the schools 
themselves. This effect, dubbed ‘selection by mortgage’, potentially affects admissions to 
any popular school whose oversubscription criteria include a distance criterion. 
The report uses a statistical method that controls for both variation in preferences, and 
home location, to isolate and examine families’ different chances of successfully 
accessing Church schools and other autonomous schools, for children with different 
characteristics.  
13 
3 The Data 
To gain insights into choices and selection, the project capitalises on the newly-available 
parental preferences data for England. The full dataset consists of records for all children 
who were in year 6 in the academic year 2013/14, and applying to an English state-
maintained secondary school for entry in September 2014. For each child we have a 
record listing up to six schools that were ranked by the child’s parents as part of the Local 
Authority’s co-ordinated allocations process. We also have the child’s Key Stage 2 (KS2) 
results and year 6 census record, and the linked year 7 census record for 2014/15, where 
available. The school identifiers also allow linking to school performance tables 
(containing school-level GCSE performance measures), the school-level census data (for 
demographic information), historical Ofsted data, and to Edubase, the public database of 
schools’ information. 
The preferences dataset identifies the schools listed by each parent, and also identifies 
the school that was offered to the parent at the conclusion of the admissions process. 
From this we can determine the family’s chosen school, whether or not the child gained 
admission to that school, and the rank of the school that the child did gain admission to. 
The linked datasets provide the child’s location, prior attainment, ethnicity, Pupil Premium 
status and other characteristics, as well as identifying the secondary school the child 
actually enrolled in, if the child stayed in the state sector. 
3.1 The secondary school admissions process 
Each year, parents in England who wish to send their children to state-maintained 
secondary schools are invited to rank between three and six schools in order of 
preference. Parents are encouraged to use all of their options, but many parents submit 
only one or two preferences. Local authorities receive the ranked lists and inform schools 
of the applications they have received5. 
Whenever the number of applications received by a school exceeds its Published 
Admissions Number (PAN), the quota set by the school for admissions, the school is 
asked to submit to the local authority a ranking of applicants according to the school’s 
published admissions policy. For community schools the local authority creates the 
ranking. Own-admissions authority schools, such as academies and voluntary-aided 
schools, use information they have gathered through the admissions process and 
supplementary information forms to rank applications themselves. 
                                            
 
5 Note that, since the Admissions Code of 2007, schools are not informed of the parents’ rankings of the 
school, so that they cannot prioritise, say, first preferences above second or third preferences. 
14 
Local authorities then use parents’ ranked lists of schools, and schools’ ranked lists of 
children, to allocate school places fairly and ensure that every child is allocated to a 
school. This part of the process is not as straightforward as it sounds, and in fact the 
efficient solution to the problem of reconciling all of these preferences and priorities 
draws upon a substantial body of theory in the fields of economics and computer 
science6. 
Although it is not necessary to go into the details of this theory, it is sufficient to recognise 
that there may be more than one plausible allocation for a given set of preferences and 
priorities, and that the details of the allocation mechanism affect not only the outcomes of 
the admissions process, but also, potentially, the incentives that parents (and admissions 
authorities) face in submitting their lists of preferences (priorities). In short, each local 
authority uses an algorithm7 to reconcile the competing rankings of parents and schools 
to compute an allocation that satisfies some criteria of fairness and maximises 
satisfaction. After parents have been informed of their child’s allocation, they may appeal 
the decision or request to be added to their preferred school’s waiting list. 
3.2 The impact on analyses of strategic choices 
When asked to provide a ranking of secondary schools, parents are expected to order 
schools according to their underlying preferences for those schools. The allocation 
mechanism then uses both parents’ rankings of schools, and schools’ rankings of pupils 
(according to their admissions policies) to compute an allocation of pupils to schools. 
However, the assumption that parents rank all schools according to their true preferences 
is a strong assumption, and there are several plausible ways in which the assumption 
may be violated. 
First, the implementation of the admissions system may be such that parents are 
disincentivised from listing their true preferences (in the sense of increasing the risk of 
receiving a less-preferred allocation), and second, there may be widespread 
misconceptions about the admissions process that mean that even when it is in parents’ 
best interests to rank schools straightforwardly, they may not be aware of this. 
The strategic incentives that parents face depend to some extent on the details of the 
admissions system and particularly the allocation mechanism. Although there is no 
recent survey of all allocation mechanisms used by local authorities, the majority of local 
authorities apparently use a variant of the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) 
algorithm to compute an allocation (Gale and Shapley, 1962). Under ideal conditions, this 
algorithm has a ‘strategy-proofness’ property, which means that parents cannot improve 
                                            
 
6 The branch of economics known as mechanism design uses game theory to analyse the properties of 
allocation mechanisms. 
7 The specific algorithm used depends upon the local authority.  
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their children’s allocation by ranking schools strategically, for example by taking into 
account acceptance probabilities when including or ordering schools. In other words, 
parents should not take into account admissions policies, and should just consider their 
rankings as if they were guaranteed entry to any school. Anecdotally, this appears to run 
counter to some parents’ understanding of the admissions process. 
However, the DA algorithm as implemented in England may fail to achieve this ‘strategy-
proofness’ property, because local authorities limit the length of parents’ preference lists. 
Under these conditions, where slots are rationed, parents may need to select schools 
strategically to avoid allocation to a school they did not express a preference for. If 
children fail to gain admission to any of their stated preferences, they will typically be 
allocated by the local authority to the nearest school with spare capacity, which may not 
even be near to the child’s home. The potential severity of this problem is inversely 
proportional to the maximum length of preference lists. 
So, the issues affecting parents’ incentives to list schools according to their true 
preferences, relate to both the design of admissions systems, and confusion about the 
details of the process. The possibility that parents are, to some extent, second-guessing 
chances of admission when ranking schools, must be taken account of when interpreting 
the results of discrete choice analyses. It must also be taken account of when using 
admissions statistics to gauge the level of parental satisfaction with the choice process. 
3.3 Choice of locations 
The full record for 2013/14 contains about half a million records. Due to the complexity of 
the statistical models to be estimated, it is infeasible to use the entire dataset. Instead we 
select a sample from Greater London, and choose three other locations for comparison. 
Greater Manchester and the metropolitan area around Birmingham were selected, as the 
largest metropolitan areas in England apart from London. Both cities have dense school 
markets with diverse secondary school provision, and socio-economically and ethnically 
diverse populations. 
Providing a less metropolitan comparison is more difficult, as the sample sizes of socio-
economic and ethnic minority groups tend to be very small outside large cities. However, 
it was felt to be important to include such a comparison to evaluate the extent to which 
the ‘London effect’ might be more generally a ‘metropolitan effect’. 
The area of West Yorkshire and East Lancashire straddling the M62 corridor in between 
Manchester and Leeds, was selected as it contains a number of small towns with socio-
economically and ethnically diverse populations close to, yet geographically and 
economically distinct from, the neighbouring cities. The area overlaps with the North 
Eastern boroughs of Greater Manchester: Bury; Rochdale; and Oldham. Three towns in 
the area, Bradford, Burnley and Oldham, suffered riots in 2001 that brought attention to 
ethnic divisions in the area. At the time, ethnically-segregated secondary schools were 
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cited as a possible contributing factor to the problem (Cantle, 2001; Ouseley, 2001). The 
sample includes two towns recently designated ‘education opportunity areas’ – Bradford 
and Oldham. This sample is named ‘Pennines’ because the sample area falls within the 
Pennines upland region of Northern England. 
The London sample comprises a random sample of children living in one of the 32 
London boroughs and applying for a secondary school place in 2013/14. The initial 
sample size was 25,000, from a total cohort of about 78,000. The Manchester sample 
comprises all children living in the local authorities comprising Greater Manchester: 
Bolton; Bury; Manchester; Oldham; Rochdale; Salford; Stockport; Tameside; Trafford; 
and Wigan. The Birmingham sample encompasses children living in: Birmingham; 
Coventry; Dudley; Sandwell; Solihull; Walsall; and Wolverhampton. The Pennines 
sample encompasses the local authorities of Bradford, Kirklees, Calderdale, Bury, 
Rochdale, Oldham, Blackburn with Darwen and part of Lancashire to the East of 
Blackburn. Note that the schools in each sample may fall outside these areas, since 
children within the areas are permitted to apply for schools in other local authorities. 
3.4 Demographics 
Table 1 shows the ethnic composition of each of the samples, using four broad ethnic 
categories (see section 5.4. for a full description). All of the samples have larger minority 
ethnic populations than the rest of England. However, London stands out as having a far 
more ethnically diverse population of children than the other areas; it is the only location 
in which the white British ethnic group is not a majority, and indeed the relative 
proportions of the four groups in London are almost equal. 
The South Asian category has large proportions in all four areas, with the Birmingham 
and Pennines samples having higher proportions of South Asian pupils than London. In 
contrast, the population of children belonging to the black category appears to be more 
geographically concentrated in London and Birmingham.  
Table 1: Ethnic mix (%) by location 
% White Black S. Asian Other 
London 30 26 23 21 
Birmingham 51 12 29 7 
Manchester 70 6 17 6 
Pennines 68 2 26 4 
Rest of England 84 3 6 6 
 
The distribution of children eligible for Pupil Premium (Table 2) is much less 
geographically varied. The three metropolitan samples all show a rough 60:40 split, 
whereas the Pennines sample is closer to the rest of England at about 70:30. 
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Table 2: Pupil Premium proportions (%) by location 
% Not Pupil Premium Pupil Premium 
London 60 40 
Birmingham 59 41 
Manchester 64 36 
Pennines 68 32 
Rest of England 74 26 
3.5 Characteristics of schools 
Each of the four sampled areas contains a mix of autonomous and community schools, a 
small proportion of grammar schools, and some Church schools. In the context of the 
report, autonomous schools are those governance types that set and administer their 
own admissions policies, otherwise known as own-admissions authority schools. This 
includes academies (of all types), free schools, foundation schools and voluntary aided 
schools, but not voluntary controlled schools or community schools. Throughout the text, 
“Church schools” refers only to the two most common denominations – Church of 
England (C of E) and Roman Catholic (RC). The proportion of other denominations is 
very small. In most cases Church schools and grammar schools are also autonomous 
schools.   
Table 3 shows that the proportion of autonomous schools is highest in Birmingham, and 
smaller in the North West. There is a greater proportion of grammar schools in the 
Birmingham area, and the smallest proportion of grammar schools is in the Pennines. 
The largest proportion of Church schools is in Manchester. 
Table 3: % of schools of different types by location 
% Autonomous Grammar Church 
London 80 4.1 24 
Birmingham 84 5.9 16 
Manchester 69 4.3 29 
Pennines 70 3.4 25 
Rest of England 81 5.5 14 
NB: types are not mutually exclusive and so do not sum to 100 in each row. For 
example the majority of grammar schools and Church schools are also their 




Figure 1 shows clearly that the Ofsted performance of schools in London surpasses the 
other areas. Birmingham has a slightly larger proportion of Outstanding schools than 
Manchester or the Pennines, but all three areas have a similar proportion of schools that 
are either ‘Requires Improvement’ or ‘Special Measures’, which in all three cases is 
higher than in the rest of England. 
 
Figure 1: Proportions of Ofsted scores by location 
London Birmingham Manchester Pennines Other
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4 Descriptive Statistics 
4.1 Proportion admitted to most-preferred school 
The headline figure of the proportion of parents receiving their first preference school 
has, until now, been one of the few pieces of information about each local authority’s 
admissions process that has been made public. The proportion is always high – 
nationally almost 90% of parents receive their first-choice school. 
The national preferences data allows us to disaggregate these headline statistics on 
‘parental satisfaction’ by demographic group. Table 4 shows the proportion of parents 
receiving their top-ranked school by ethnicity and by Pupil Premium status for each 
location. 
Overall parents are much less likely to obtain their preferred allocation in London (74%) 
than the national average (88%). In Birmingham also parents are less likely to achieve 
their preferred school (80%), whereas Manchester and Pennines appear closer to the 
rest of England in terms of preference rate. 
The difference in proportions for Pupil Premium vs. non-Pupil Premium families is quite 
small or non-existent. In contrast,  the difference between white and other ethnic groups 
is striking in every location. For example, in London 84% of white families achieve their 
top preference, whereas only 68% and 71% of black and South Asian families, 
respectively, achieve theirs. 
Table 4: % of families achieving most preferred school 
 London Birmingham Manchester Pennines R. of England England 
White 84 89 93 93 94 93 
Black 68 72 77 85 80 73 
S. Asian 71 68 80 76 80 75 
Other 72 78 82 85 86 80 
       
not PP 75 80 89 89 92 89 
PP 73 80 88 86 92 86 
        
All 74 80 89 88 92 88 
 
Although striking, these statistics do not necessarily imply that parents in London and 
Birmingham, and parents of minority ethnicities are less satisfied with their allocation than 
other parents. It is possible that they are simply more likely to express a risky preference 
for their first preference, and place a less ambitious ‘insurance’ school lower down in their 
rankings, whereas white parents and parents living in other neighbourhoods might be 
more likely to (erroneously) believe they should name their first preference strategically. 
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4.2 Number of schools ranked 
We can gain some insight into geographical and demographic variations in the operation 
of school markets by examining the way that parents use the admissions system. 
Although each local authority maintains its own admissions system, the admissions 
systems share similar features. The 32 London Boroughs collaborate within the Pan-
London Admissions authority, to give parents in Greater London a unified admissions 
process. Within the Pan-London Admissions system parents may rank up to six schools. 
Other local authorities outside London must allow parents to rank at least three schools. 
In practice local authorities allow parents to rank between three and six schools. 
Table 5: % of families ranking each number of schools by location 
# ranked London Birmingham Manchester Pennines R. of England 
1 11 25 35 25 42 
2-3 37 45 55 65 49 
4-6 51 29 10 11 9 
 
Table 5 provides the proportions in each location ranking only one, two to three, or more 
than three schools. In London parents are far less likely to rank only one school, and far 
more likely to rank 4-6 schools, than in any other area. More than half of parents rank 4-6 
schools, compared to less than one in ten in the rest of England. Birmingham’s parents 
are also more likely to rank more schools than the rest of England. However, in 
Manchester and the Pennines the proportion ranking 4-6 schools is only slightly higher 
than the rest of England, although the number ranking only one school is lower. 
There are a few possible explanations for these patterns. First, variation in admissions 
systems may account for much of the variation in parents ranking 4-6 schools. Parents in 
London can all rank up to six schools, but in Birmingham, Manchester and the rest of 
England, admissions systems are much more fragmented. Second, the number of viable 
options for a parent may be expected to depend on the density of the local school 
market, which in turn will depend on the local population density. Rural areas will have far 
fewer schools within a certain radius, and this may mean that parents only have one or 
two viable choices. What is more, parents may be relatively sure of admission to schools 
in rural areas due to lack of demand from other parents. 
Relative admission probabilities may play a greater role in variation in urban areas also. 
One conjecture is that London seems to have a smaller proportion of schools with formal 
geographical priority areas (aka catchment areas) than in other cities. Without a recent 
survey of admissions arrangements this is impossible to verify, but if true, it would partly 
explain the proportions of parents expressing more than one preference, since in this 
context most families would not be reasonably confident of admission to a local school, 
and will therefore be more likely to express multiple “insurance” choices. 
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These considerations mean that it is difficult to draw conclusions from looking at 
geographical variation in use of the admissions system. We can, however, look at 
variation in ranking behaviour for different demographic groups, since we might not 
expect admissions systems to vary greatly within a given location for different socio-
economic and ethnic groups. 
Table 6 presents proportions ranking different numbers of schools by location, ethnicity 
and Pupil Premium (PP) eligibility. Within each location, Pupil Premium children’s families 
are slightly more likely to rank only one school, and less likely to rank 4-6 schools. This 
may suggest less engagement with the admissions process. However, there are other 
possible explanations. For example, it may be that, due to where they live, or admissions 
arrangements, Pupil Premium children’s families have fewer acceptable options, or are 
more likely to choose schools that they are relatively confident of admission, such as 
local schools with spare capacity. 
Table 6: % of families ranking each number of schools by ethnicity and Pupil Premium eligibility 
# ranked White Black S. Asian Other  not PP PP 
London 
1 16 8 9 11  10 13 
2-3 45 31 35 37  36 39 
4-6 39 61 56 52  54 48 
Birmingham 
1 32 19 17 25  23 30 
2-3 51 43 37 44  47 43 
4-6 18 37 46 30  30 28 
Manchester 
1 38 25 28 34  33 40 
2-3 54 60 57 52  56 53 
4-6 8 14 15 14  11 7 
Pennines 
1 27 26 16 29  24 27 
2-3 67 62 59 61  67 61 
4-6 5 12 25 10  10 12 
 
The patterns of ethnic variation in ranking behaviour are more striking. Black and South 
Asian ethnic groups in particular appear to be more likely to rank more schools, 
compared to white families. Again, although there are competing explanations for this, a 
plausible explanation is that these minority ethnic groups are more engaged with school 
choice than white families. However, geographical variation in admissions systems, the 
density of local secondary school provision, and relative prospects of admission into local 
schools are all plausible explanatory factors. 
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5 Modelling school choices 
The aim of the second method is to model parental decision-making when faced with 
trade-offs between convenience (for example, avoiding large home-school commutes), 
quality of teaching and learning, peer groups and other considerations.  
Tabulating the proportions of parents who choose different schools does not account for 
the uneven spatial distribution of pupils and schools. Using a statistical model, we can 
account for these spatial irregularities and uncover patterns in the choices that parents 
make, given the options that they face. 
The main focus of the current analysis will be to produce estimates of parents’ 
Willingness to Travel for improvements in academic performance, and compare these 
estimates across demographic groups and across locations.  Thus we can directly 
quantify any geographic or demographic variation in parental engagement with school 
choice. 
Previous work to model parental school preferences is limited, because of the rarity of 
choice data. In the UK Burgess et al. (2014) used the Millenium Cohort Study to conduct 
a discrete choice analysis. In the US, Hastings et al. (2006), and Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 
(2015) have used choice data to study the determinants of preferences. This study uses 
a similar methodology to these previous studies. However, the data at our disposal is of a 
scale and quality that has not been used before in the UK or the US, and consequently 
much richer models may be estimated. 
5.1 The discrete choice model 
A discrete choice model shares the same basic structure as a regression model. There is 
a dependent variable, in this case a binary variable indicating whether a pupil chose a 
particular school, and a set of independent (predictor) variables whose influence upon 
the dependent variable is being modelled. Since the dependent variable is a binary, and 
not a continuous variable, an extra stage in the model is needed to translate the 
continuous linear predictions of the regression model into statements about the 
probability of the dependent variable taking a value of one, which corresponds to the 
family choosing the school. 
The convention in discrete choice modelling is to conceptualise the regression model as 
predicting a latent (unobserved) variable called utility. Each family is assumed to have a 
separate utility value for each school, which is known to the family but unobserved by the 
researcher. The family simply chooses the school which gives it the greatest amount of 
utility. A family’s utility for a school is a function of the predictor variables – observed 
variables relating to the school’s characteristics, the family’s/child’s characteristics, and 
interactions of the two – plus a random idiosyncratic element (akin to the error term in a 
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regression). Such models are thus known as random utility models. The model used here 
is described more fully in Appendix 4. 
5.2 Convenience-Performance trade-offs in school choice 
The estimated coefficients of a logit discrete choice model can be interpreted as log odds 
ratios, relating odds of a pupil choosing a given school when a particular variable in the 
model is at a particular value, to the odds of choosing a school after a unit change in that 
variable. However, this interpretation is not intuitively easy to use. Additionally, as the 
number of demographic groups for whom the coefficients are separately estimated 
increases, the interpretation of interactions between variables and pupil group identifiers 
becomes increasingly complicated.  
We require a straightforward representation that relates the estimated choice model to 
parental decision-making, such that the relative strength of demand for academic 
performance is revealed. Typically in discrete choice contexts where money is involved, 
coefficients can be converted into monetary values, known as Willingness to Pay. In the 
context of school choice we can use distance, rather than money, as a yardstick against 
which to measure preferences for test scores. The idea is that parents may face a trade-
off between seeking a school with high academic performance, and the convenience of 
settling for a closer school. Note that for a given family no trade-off between distance and 
performance may be necessary – the best school may also be the closest – but the 
model allows the estimation of trade-offs that parents would make, if they had to. 
A parent’s Willingness to Travel (WTT) can be interpreted as an approximation to the 
additional distance that a parent would be “willing” (willingness here meant in an 
economic sense as encompassing willingness and ability) to travel for a 10 point 
improvement in test scores (say, from 70% achieving 5+ A*-C at GCSE to 80%). It is 
described more fully in Annex 4. 
5.3 Non-randomness of home location 
In interpreting the results of the choice model, and especially in interpreting estimated 
Willingnesses to Travel, the non-random assignment of pupils to home locations must be 
considered. The locations of family homes are not completely independent of the quality 
of the local school market, since families choose where to live partly on the basis of the 
quality of the local school market. We do not model this choice process. It is possible that 
part of a family’s overall Willingness to Travel for academic quality has been subsumed 
within previous residential moves, for example by compromising between the school 
commute and work commutes in choosing where to live. This is, of course, mediated by 
house prices, which may go up or down in response to demand for nearby schools. 
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If there are systematic variations in the ways that different demographic groups choose 
where to live, whether because of differences in ability to pay or for any other reason, the 
estimated Willingness to Travel may reflect these differences, rather than underlying 
attitudes to schooling. For example, a demographic group may appear to be less willing 
to travel, whereas in fact they are more likely to choose to live in an area that is already 
near to preferred schools. What this means is that we can only interpret Willingness to 
Travel relative to the residential distribution of demographic groups. 
5.4 Specification of the model 
The main aim of the model is to quantify the parental valuation of the academic 
performance of the school, and the trade-off that parents may have to make between 
academics and convenience (proximity). Of particular importance is the extent to which 
this trade-off is evaluated differently by families from different socio-economic and ethnic 
groups, and taking into account different levels of prior attainment. 
To this end, the pupil utility model must take account of academic performance as 
measured by test scores, as we wish to evaluate the extent to which families prefer 
higher-performing schools. It must also take account of proximity, as parents have 
obvious incentives to prefer closer schools over schools further away, all things being 
equal. The NPD data contains the postcodes of both schools and pupils as well as the 
Ordnance Survey co-ordinates of postcodes, measured at the geographical centre, or 
centroid, of the postcode area. The OS co-ordinates are used to calculate the linear 
distance between each pupil’s postcode and each school in kilometres.  
We include both distance and the natural logarithm of distance in the model. Taking the 
log of a variable is a common variable transformation in econometric analysis. Whereas 
the coefficient of an untransformed variable is interpreted as a measure of the decision-
maker’s consideration of a unit change in that variable, the coefficient of a logged 
variable can be interpreted as the decision-maker’s sensitivity to a proportional change in 
that variable. For example, a model including only a linear term for distance would 
impose the assumption that a parent cares as much about a difference between a school 
1 km away and a school 2 km away, as she does about the difference between a school 
21 km away and a school 22 km away. The coefficient on the logged variable, in contrast, 
assumes that a parent cares only about the proportional change in distance, so that a 
10% increase in distance at 1 km (to 1.1 km) matters as much as a 10% increase in 
distance at 20 km (to 22 km). Including both of these terms in the model allows for both 
types of consideration, or a mixture of the two. 
With regards to measuring academic performance, there are several possible 
alternatives. During the period in which the 2013 intake were deciding upon secondary 
schools, the most high profile measure of test score success was the proportion of pupils 
achieving five or more A*-C grades at GCSE (AC5). Other measures include GCSE point 
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scores and value-added measures (Best 8 value-added). However, the value-added 
framework was in a transitional state in 2013/14, and the ‘Best 8’ VA measure was not 
well-publicised, therefore parents may not have been sufficiently aware of the value-
added measure to take it into account in decision-making. Ofsted scores are another 
high-profile measure of school effectiveness. However, Ofsted scores have a broader 
focus than just academic performance, and additionally only have four levels, so are not 
finely differentiated enough to provide the main measure of academic success. However, 
Ofsted scores are included in the model to explain residual variation in popularity after 
controlling for test scores. 
The AC5 variable originally takes values in between 0 and 100, and is scaled to take 
values between 0 and 10, so that a unit change in the variable corresponds to a change 
of 10 points in the proportion of pupils achieving five or more GCSEs at A*-C. 
Since a ‘raw’ measure of exam success has been used as the main measure of 
academic performance, it is important to consider the ways in which scores are 
correlated with the characteristics of the intake. Some secondary schools predominantly 
take in pupils who have good attainment prior to starting at secondary school, either 
because of entry criteria, or demographic variation in their catchment areas. Other 
schools’ intakes have lower prior attainment. One reason for taking this variation into 
account is to allow for the possibility that what parents really care about is ‘value-added’ 
– that is, the academic performance of pupils relative to their starting points. It is possible 
that parents may consider this to be a more reliable indicator of underlying teaching 
quality. It is also important to consider the converse, that what parents really care about 
is the ‘quality’ of peer groups. 
We can use the average Key Stage 2 points score (KS2 APS) of a secondary school’s 
intake as a measure of the academic characteristics of the peer group. The average KS2 
points score summarises the prior attainment of the cohort before they joined the 
secondary school. This is highly correlated with the same cohort’s AC5, and can be used 
to decompose the relative contributions to AC5 of ‘value-added’ and the ‘peer group’. To 
achieve this, we regress AC5 on a flexible function of KS2 APS, and decompose AC5 
into predicted values (representing the effect of the prior attainment of the intake) and 
residuals (representing a crude ‘value-added’ measure). 
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Figure 2: Decomposition of AC5 into predicted value and residual on KS2 avg. point score 
The resulting variables – AC5_predicted and AC5_residual, which are completely 
uncorrelated – can be included in the discrete choice model at the same time to assess 
the relative importance attached by families to academic performance due to ‘peers’ and 
academic performance due to ‘value-added’. Following the decomposition, both 
AC5_predicted and AC5_residual are on the same scale as AC5, as shown in Figure 2, 
so that it is possible to compare the coefficients on the measures directly. 
There are therefore two models of interest: one which includes distance, logged distance 
and AC5; and the other which includes distance, logged distance, AC5_predicted and 
AC5_residual. 
In each of these models the coefficients for these main variables are allowed to vary by 
the pupils’ Pupil Premium status, ethnic group and prior attainment. Pupil Premium status 
is defined, for the purposes of this study, as an indicator of whether the child has been 
eligible for Free School Meals at any point in the past six years, which may be slightly 
different than the formal definition of Pupil Premium. This indicator is taken from the 
NPD. The detailed ethnicity data in the NPD was grouped into four categories: white 
British (including white Irish but excluding ‘white other’); black (including black Caribbean 
and black African, and mixtures of these); South Asian (including Indian, Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi, and mixtures of these); and other (including Chinese and ‘white other’). 
This coarse ethnic grouping ensures large enough sample sizes in each of the groups. 
To group pupils on prior attainment, each pupil’s KS2 average point score was binned 
into three categories, corresponding to the lowest 30% of scores, the middle 40%, and 
the highest 30%. 
For each ethnic group, for each KS2 group, and for Pupil Premium pupils, a separate 
coefficient was estimated for distance, logged distance and AC5 (or AC5_predicted and 
AC5_residual). 






















































Finally, variables indicating the characteristics of the school are included to ‘mop up’ 
some of the remaining variation in school popularity, not explained by test scores. Ofsted 
scores are grouped into (1: ‘Outstanding’, 2: ‘Good’ and 3: ‘less than Good’). Since only 
small numbers of schools fall into the two categories ‘Requires Improvement’ and 
‘Special Measures’ they have been grouped. In addition, Ofsted provides a measure of 
the deprivation of each school’s neighbourhood, based on Indices of Multiple Deprivation 
(IMD), an area-based measure. Three IMD groups (‘High’, ‘Medium’, and ‘Low’ – where 
‘Low’ is the least deprived). A separate coefficient is estimated for each combination of 
Ofsted score and deprivation group, allowing for interactions between Ofsted success 
and local deprivation in explaining school popularity. Indicator variables are also allowed 
for Church of England schools and Roman Catholic schools, to quantify the relative 
popularity of these denominations. The main purpose of these fixed effects is to control 
for variation on these characteristics; they are not the focus of analysis. 
5.5 Choice model results 
The estimated coefficients from the discrete choice models are presented in Table 8 and 
Table 9 in Appendix 1. The estimated coefficients on AC5, distance and logged distance 
have been used to calculate Willingness to Travel (WTT), representing the additional 
distance that a parent would be willing to travel to school, according to the model, for a 
10 percentage point improvement in test scores. 
Figure 3 presents the Willingness to Travel for London, for families with children with 
medium prior KS2 attainment. In this figure and in all subsequent figures, error bars 
extend two standard errors on either side of the estimate, and represent an approximate. 
95% confidence interval for the estimate.  
A non-Pupil Premium white family would be willing to travel about a quarter of a kilometre 
further for a school with AC5 10 points higher. However, according to the model a Pupil 
Premium white family would not be willing to trade any convenience for test scores at all.  
There is substantial variation by ethnicity; South Asian and black families without Pupil 
Premium would travel about 2.5 times as far as white families for a 10 point improvement 
in test scores. As discussed in Section 5.3, this difference may be mediated by variation 
in the residential choice process. It is possible, for example, that white families place 
more emphasis on schools when choosing where to live, so that they do not need to 
travel as far at admissions time. It is also possible that mean incomes differ for the ethnic 
groups, so that some groups are more able to pay higher prices to live in the catchment 
areas of desired schools. 
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Figure 3: Willingness to Travel at 2.5km. London only, medium KS2. 
Figure 11 in Annex 2 shows the WTT for all locations, broken down by prior KS2 
attainment of the child. The middle panel of Figure 11 reproduces the results for London, 
which are not obviously exceptional in the context of the results for the other cities. 
Interestingly, there does appear to be a difference in WTT between London and 
Manchester, on the one hand, and Birmingham and the Pennines, on the other. In 
general, the model predicts that families of high-KS2 children would be willing to travel 
further in all cities. In London this interaction is especially pronounced. 
Model B decomposes AC5 into two uncorrelated constituent elements: the part predicted 
entirely by the average prior attainment of the cohort; and the residual that is not 
predicted by the intake. The residual can be thought of as a crude value-added measure. 
The WTT from model A are compared to the two sets of WTT from model B in Figure 7 to 
Figure 10. The results for London in Figure 7 are broadly representative of those for the 
other locations. The main pattern is that in the middle panel (medium KS2 child) the WTT 
based on AC5_predicted is not significantly different from the WTT based on 
AC5_residual, and neither are significantly different from the WTT based on AC5. Since 
all three measures are on the same scale these WTT are directly comparable. This 
suggests that these parents pay attention to test scores, but do not differentiate between 
schools that have high performance because of their intake, and schools that have high 
performance because of value-added (due, for example, to effective teaching practices).  
However, the rightmost panel, for high KS2 children, shows that the differentiation of 
WTT by the prior attainment of the child is much more muted when considering 
AC5_residual, than either of the other two measures. This may be because high-KS2 
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children’s parents seek peers with similar prior attainment. Conversely, it may be 
explained by strategic ranking behaviour. Schools with a high AC5_predicted must have 
a high-prior-attainment intake, and probably many of these are academically selective. 
Parents of pupils with lower KS2 attainment may avoid applying for these schools 
because they perceive their child will not be admitted. 
The estimated WTT for the Pennines sample (Figure 10) are qualitatively different than 
the other locations, in that it is the only location in which minority ethnic families do not 
have greater demand for test scores, relative to proximity, than white families. WTT for all 
ethnic groups are lower than in Manchester and London, and especially so for South 
Asian families. 
5.6 Discussion 
Although there is some evidence of subtle variations in choice behaviour for different 
locations, these variations do not appear to be important compared to the variation in 
choices between socio-economic and ethnic groups. 
In broad terms, Pupil Premium children’s families seemed less likely to travel further to 
seek out academic performance than non-Pupil Premium children’s families, and minority 
ethnic families, particularly black and South Asian ethnicities, seemed more likely to 
travel further seek out academic performance than white families. The main exception to 
this pattern is in the Pennines, where South Asian families did not seem to travel further 
for improvements in test scores than white families. 
To what extent do these patterns represent genuine variation in preferences, and to what 
extent do they reflect strategic choices by some or all groups of parents? The results 
control for variation in pupils’ prior attainment, so admissions rules focussing on aptitude 
or ability banding (which would be expected to be more prevalent at high-performing 
schools) should not be an important issue in explaining the different propensity of 
different groups to travel for performance improvements. 
And yet, as Table 4 shows, minority ethnic groups face significantly smaller probabilities 
of accessing their first choice school. It is impossible to answer this question without 
quantifying the different chances of access to desired schools that different socio-
economic and ethnic groups face, which is the aim of the case-control matched analysis 
of school admissions selection. 
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6 Case-control analysis of admissions selection 
The aim of the current analysis is to examine the effect of school admissions practices on 
the chances of different groups being able to access chosen schools. It has been 
observed that popular schools, and particularly certain types of own-admissions authority 
schools, tend to have intakes that do not reflect the socio-economic, ethnic or ability 
composition of their local catchment areas (Andrews and Johnes, 2016; Cantle and 
Kaufmann, 2016; iCoCo et al. 2017). 
Although it has been suggested that school admissions practices may play a role in this 
apparent sorting it has not been possible, with existing data, to disentangle the effect of 
admissions arrangements from the choices that parents make between schools. The new 
preferences dataset enables choices and chances of admission, having made a choice, 
to be isolated to examine their relative contribution to stratified intakes. 
This is because, given we know the eventual offers that were made, information on 
rankings on one side of the market reveal information about rankings on the other side of 
the market (Weldon and Titman, 2015). Intuitively, if we observe that a family has named 
a school as first preference, but the child has not been offered a place at that school, 
then we know that the school ranked all of the pupils offered a place at the school higher 
than that child. This allows us to identify a set of ‘unadmitted’ pupils for each school, who 
we know were ranked lower than the ‘admitted’ pupils who were offered a place at the 
school. 
With this information, it is possible to model the probability of acceptance to a school. 
However, the most important determinant of access to schools is often the home location 
of the child’s family. The ubiquity of catchment areas and distance ‘tie-breakers’ in 
admissions policies has been dubbed ‘selection by mortgage’ since it is believed that 
admissions policies affect house prices, causing disadvantaged families to be priced out 
of the catchment areas of popular schools. We wish to study the remaining selection that 
affects families, after ‘selection by mortgage’ is accounted for. For this reason we adopt a 
design that matches nearby pupils to each other – unadmitted matched to admitted – so 
that the effect of distance to the school does not need to be considered. This ‘case-
control’ design matches ‘cases’ – unadmitted pupils – to their nearest ‘controls’ – 
admitted pupils – allowing many-to-one matches where possible. 
A possible problem with this approach is that the ‘cut-off’ – the furthest distance at which 
a school will accept pupils – is a sharp divide, and even pupils matched to other pupils 
very close (on the same street) may fall either side of this cut-off. This may introduce 
bias, as unadmitted pupils may tend to be slightly further away from the school than 
admitted pupils. In order to completely remove the possibility of this bias we can consider 
only case-control matches where the admitted pupil(s) are at least as far from the school 
as the unadmitted pupil. Figure 4 represents this case-control matching design. The 
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matching radius sets the maximum distance between matched pairs. Within the radius, 
the matching is selected to minimise the distance between cases and controls. 
 
Figure 4: Design of ‘case-control’ matching of unadmitted to admitted pupils 
6.1 The matched case-control model 
The model we specify shares a similar structure to the discrete choice model described in 
the previous section. In fact, it is useful to consider the analysis as analogous to 
modelling the way that schools “choose” which pupils to admit or reject from a “choice 
set” of pupils that are geographically close to each other. When making this analogy, it is 
important to be clear that we are not assuming that schools have agency in this choice 
process, or consciously select according to demographic characteristics, merely that the 
model for selection is similar to a model for choice. 
Appendix 5 more fully describes the model. The estimated coefficients can be interpreted 
as the logged odds ratios of rejection for a pupil with a given characteristic, compared to 
a ‘baseline’ pupil: white; medium KS2 attainment; not Pupil Premium; no Special 
Educational Needs. Perhaps a more intuitive way to interpret the coefficients is by 
imagining that a school has only one seat remaining, and a pupil A with a given 
characteristic, say Pupil Premium, is assessed for that one seat alongside a nearby 
‘baseline’ pupil B. We can calculate the probability that pupil A will be ranked lower, and 
hence fail to be admitted, in this hypothetical scenario. If Pupil Premium status is not 
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6.2 Specification of the model 
Schools’ admissions policies tend to include various elements. Some of the more 
common elements are:  
• Priority for looked-after children (this is compulsory as of Admissions Code 2007) 
• Priority for children for whom there is a medical need to attend 
• Priority for children with older siblings already attending the school 
• Priority for children living within a geographical priority area (GPA) 
• Priority for children attending certain feeder primary schools 
• Some schools select a small proportion on aptitude (e.g. musical or languages) 
• 11+ selection by grammar schools 
• Religiously designated schools may prioritise children demonstrating adherence to 
a certain faith. Evidence required varies greatly, but may require, for example, 
validation by a minister of the faith 
• Banding on academic ability, whereby a school allocates quotas for each prior 
attainment band 
• After these criteria have been applied, Some measure of distance from the school 
is the most common criterion used to break ties between children with the same 
priority. 
 
There is scant information in the data to model these admissions criteria. We do not 
know about siblings, faith, feeder primary schools, GPAs, or aptitude. What we can do is 
model the average effect of these admissions criteria on our different family groups. That 
is, in aggregate, do admissions policies tend to differentially affect Pupil Premium, or 
non-Pupil Premium pupils, different ethnic groups, or different ability groups?  
Looked after children are excluded from the analysis, as schools are legally obliged give 
them top priority. Similarly, although the law is more ambiguous about ‘medical reasons’ 
for acceptance, pupils with Special Educational Needs (SEN) who have a Statement8 
have been excluded as their allocation is usually jointly decided by the parents, schools 
and local authorities. Non-statemented SEN pupils have not been removed but their 
status is controlled for in the model. 
Grammar schools are also excluded from this analysis, since their method of selection 
means that families are often aware of whether or not they have met the requirement 
                                            
 
8 Most children with SEN do not have a Statement of SEN. Obtaining a Statement of SEN provides 
recognition of more complex needs and can facilitate access to funding and assistance, including 
consideration of needs in school admissions. Statements are being replaced by Education, Health and 
Care (EHC) plans. 
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before they state their preferences. Each child’s KS2 attainment, binned into three 
categories as in the previous analysis, is used as a proxy for the academic ability of the 
child. Schools do not have access to this measure as the tests do not take place until 
after the allocation is finalised. However, some autonomous non-Grammar schools make 
use of aptitude tests that assess aptitude in a prescribed subject, and so admission into 
oversubscribed autonomous schools might be expected to be correlated with KS2 
scores. 
We split schools into three categories: non-denominational autonomous schools that set 
and administer their own admissions policies (includes foundation schools, academies, 
voluntary-aided schools and free schools); autonomous Church of England (C of E) and 
Roman Catholic (RC) Church schools, the majority of which have some faith criteria in 
their admissions policies; and community schools whose admissions policies are set and 
administered by the local authority (includes community schools and voluntary-controlled 
schools). The small number of faith schools with denominations other than C of E and 
RC are included in the non-denominational category according to their governance 
status. In 2013, about 80% of secondary schools have admissions autonomy (cf. Table 
3). Separate coefficients are estimated for Church, other autonomous and community 
schools. 
6.3 Results of case-control model 
The estimated coefficients from the matched logit model are presented in Table 10 and 
Table 11 in Appendix 3. The first aim of the analysis is to determine whether the relative 
access of different pupil groups to schools is qualitatively different in London compared to 
other cities. 
The model also estimates separate interactions for each school type, which means that it 
is also possible to compare the effects of admissions policies at Church schools and 
autonomous schools to those at community schools, to determine if admissions 
autonomy leads to less equitable outcomes for different demographic groups. 
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Figure 5: Estimated probabilities of being ranked lower than a white, medium-KS2, non-Pupil 
Premium child at a similar home location, for admissions in London using a matching radius of 
1000m. 
Figure 5 presents the probability estimates for London. The probability of being ranked 
lower than a ‘reference’ pupil is also the probability that a pupil with a given characteristic 
will fail to gain the last remaining seat at a school, when assessed for that seat alongside 
the reference pupil. If the confidence intervals do not cover 0.5 this means that the 
characteristic has a statistically significant effect on the probability of admission. 
As expected, there is some evidence that children with higher KS2 were more likely to be 
admitted into autonomous schools, including autonomous Church schools. There is also 
evidence of differential access for both Pupil Premium pupils and minority ethnic pupils, 
to autonomous schools and Church schools. However, the estimated coefficients for 
Church schools are much larger. 
In a hypothetical comparison between a Pupil Premium child and a non-Pupil Premium 
child for a Church school place, the probability that the Pupil Premium child would not be 
admitted is 0.62. If a South Asian child is assessed for a single seat at a Church school 
alongside a white child, the corresponding probability that the South Asian child would 
not be admitted is 0.77. 
Figure 6 presents the results for Birmingham and Manchester combined. Although the 
estimates are noisier they are qualitatively similar. The main difference is that there is 
less evidence of a correlation between prior attainment and probability of admission at 
autonomous and Church schools. The estimates of selection on Pupil Premium are also 
smaller, and not significantly different from zero, for other autonomous schools, whilst for 
Church schools the estimates of selection effects for Pupil Premium and South Asian 
pupils are slightly larger than London. 
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Figure 6: Estimated probabilities of being ranked lower than a white, medium-KS2, non-Pupil 
Premium child at a similar home location, for admissions in Manchester and Birmingham using a 
matching radius of 1000m. 
As a robustness check, Figure 12 and Figure 13 in the appendix present the same 
estimates for different matching radii, including 200m, 500m and 1000m. The estimated 
probabilities become noisier as the radius is reduced due to the decreasing sample size, 
but the results are not qualitatively affected. 
6.4 Discussion 
As with the previous analysis, the general picture is of clear differences in the experience 
of the admissions process, and the application of oversubscription criteria in particular, by 
ethnic groups that appear to be broadly similar across locations. There appears to be a 
differential treatment of different demographic groups by some types of school. 
These effects appear to be driven primarily by Church schools, although there is more 
moderate evidence of selection at other autonomous schools in London. Therefore, 
possible explanations must focus on the admissions practices of Church schools, which 
are varied but often include the use of supplementary information forms, feeder primary 
schools, requirements for attendance at religious worship, and countersignatures by 
members of the clergy. 
Given the estimated willingness of minority ethnic groups to travel for academic 
performance, it is possible that parents of minority ethnicities are more willing to take 
risks in applying for desired schools for which they have low probability of admission. 
However, it must be borne in mind that these results control for distance; the difference in 
admission probabilities cannot be explained by parents choosing schools that are further 
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away. If they are more willing to take risks, it must be in negotiating other 
oversubscription criteria besides distance. 
The low probability of acceptance of South Asian children might be explained by the 
lower proportion of South Asian families that identify as Christian. More surprising is the 
lower probability of acceptance of black families who, according to the 2011 census, are 
more likely to identify as Christian (69%) than white families (64%). However, this does 
not necessarily imply that the black families that fail to secure admission to their chosen 
church school are Christian, or that they are practicing members of the relevant 
denomination. 
The results do not imply that Church schools are cream-skimming pupils, nor do they 
provide any evidence that admissions oversubscription criteria are not being applied in 
accordance with the Admissions Code. However, the results are striking in that they 
appear to refute the notion that differences in the composition of Church schools and 
other types of school can be explained entirely by parents’ preferences.  As Table 7 
shows, black and ‘other’ ethnicities are, in fact, more likely to choose Church schools 
than white parents, and South Asian families only slightly less likely. 
Table 7: % choosing different types of school by ethnicity and Pupil Premium eligibility 
  White Black S. Asian Other  not PP PP  All 
Church 16 27 15 23  17 16  17 
Autonomous 64 56 60 59  63 62  63 
Community 20 17 25 18  20 21  20 
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7 Conclusions 
7.1 Social mobility and the London effect 
The broad picture from the choice analysis is that, although there are some geographical 
differences in behaviour, it is subtle, and less important than variation between socio-
economic, ethnic, and prior-attainment groups in describing the structure of local 
education markets. London does not seem to ‘stand out from the crowd’ in terms of 
parental choice behaviour after accounting for demographics, except when it comes to 
high-KS2 children and their families, and this finding may be to do with strategic choices. 
However, London does stand out from the crowd in terms of its demographics. Table 1 
shows that the ethnic mix of London’s children is far more diverse than England’s other 
largest cities. The city’s children are also, thanks to the London effect itself, more likely to 
have high prior attainment. This means that the aggregate behaviour of parents in 
London is likely to be more performance-seeking, both in terms of ‘peer groups’ and 
‘value-added’. As discussed in the introduction this is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for the kind of quasi-market competitive mechanism that might drive up 
standards in the Capital, relative to other cities. So these results are not inconsistent with 
the ‘market structure’ hypothesis for the London effect. However, it is not clear whether 
the other conditions for effective quasi-market competition are met in London, particularly 
the need for sufficient capacity at demanded schools, and financial consequences for 
falling demand. 
The results also indicate persistent differences between ethnic groups that point to 
different attitudes to educational success. This project is limited in scope and so we have 
not attempted to offer explanations for these findings, except to caution that differences 
in preferences between groups are probably due in part to differences in access to 
schools, and the non-random spatial distribution of families of different backgrounds. 
People’s school choices are inextricably linked with their opportunities to access schools. 
The current admissions system does not incentivise parents to state their preferences 
entirely transparently, without taking into account probabilities of acceptance. What we 
observe are possibly strategic choices that combine ‘true’ preferences with assessment 
of the risks of stating a particular ranking. What is more, our analysis of admissions 
reveals that different demographic groups face different admission probabilities to the 
same schools, meaning that the socio-economic and ethnic variation in choice priorities 
that we observe may also be influenced by strategic choices. 
In the light of this, strategic explanations for observed choice behaviour must be 
considered before other explanations can be entertained. Do Pupil Premium pupils’ 
families value academic performance less and proximity more than non-Pupil Premium 
pupils, or are they acting on the belief that that they are less likely to be admitted, and 
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therefore risk wasting an option, if they make choices which prioritise a school’s GCSE 
performance? Do high-KS2 pupils’ families value academic performance more, or are we 
just observing that they are more likely to be confident of acceptance at a school that 
operates some form of academic oversubscription criterion? 
However, it is unlikely that all of the variation in parental preferences can be explained 
away. The remaining variation in preferences, particularly the ethnic dimension, begs 
further scrutiny, perhaps employing sociological or ethnographic methods that are 
outside the scope of this project. Yet it would be worthwhile to go into greater depth in 
investigating the reasons behind these observed patterns of ethnic variation in 
preferences, as well as exceptions to these patterns such as in the Pennines, because it 
is possible that these ‘anomalies’ contain important insights. 
7.2 Admissions practices 
The results of the admissions analysis provide evidence that disadvantaged and minority 
ethnic pupils appear to be less likely to be admitted into own-admissions authority 
schools, and particularly faith schools. 
After controlling for the residential location of pupils, and their prior ability, the remaining 
differences in rejection probabilities cannot be explained by residential sorting, house 
prices, or residual (i.e. non-grammar school) aptitude selection.  
The estimates of the effect of a school’s denomination (in Table 8 and Table 9 in 
Appendix 1) suggest that Church of England and Roman Catholic schools are not in 
higher demand than other schools after accounting for test scores. However, faith 
schools generally perform well, and because of this are popular with minority ethnic 
families who, it has been shown, tend to value academic performance highly. 
Previous research has discussed the socio-economically and ethnically segregated 
intakes of Church schools (cf. iCoCo et al, 2017) but has not been able to determine 
whether this segregation was primarily explained by parental preferences or admissions 
arrangements. These findings imply that the patterns of segregation in Church schools 
are not explained by preferences, and are, at least in part, due to children failing to gain 
admission at chosen schools.  
7.3 Further work 
This project has provided a ‘first look’ at the newly-compiled parental preferences data, 
and the insights into the English education market that can be gleaned from it. The 
author is part of a team embarking on a two-year project, funded by the Nuffield 
Foundation and led by Professor Ian Walker at Lancaster University, that will be using 
the data to further explore and flesh out these themes. 
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We intend to use rich models of school choice in several ways. First, we will evaluate the 
experience of school choice nationally, to determine the existence of choice ‘deserts’ and 
the effect of variations in school choice on the functioning of education markets. Related 
to this, we will examine the extent of peer preferences – that is, families’ consideration of 
schools’ socio-economic and ethnic composition, rather than their performance, in 
making school choices. 
Second, there is potential for models of school choice to be used to improve quasi-
experimental designs for the evaluation of education policies. This is because currently 
school choice behaviour is a black box that potentially biases the assignment of pupils to 
different schools. Being able to model this part of the assignment process will open up 
the possibility of accounting for this bias, to enable more accurate evaluations of policies 
such as the academies programme, or the proposed expansion of grammar schools. 
There are therefore several avenues to extend these analyses, and at each stage we will 
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Appendix 1: Estimated discrete choice models 
Table 8: Estimates of model A for all locations 
  London     Birmingham   Manchester   Pennines     
Coefficient Est. St. Err.   Est. St. Err.   Est. St. Err.   Est. St. Err.   
AC5 (10 points)                         
 0.239 (0.015) *** 0.241 (0.014) *** 0.350 (0.013) *** 0.262 (0.013) *** 
x black 0.244 (0.022) *** 0.081 (0.023) *** 0.222 (0.038) *** 0.067 (0.050)  
x other 0.133 (0.022) *** -0.039 (0.025)  0.044 (0.028)  0.025 (0.035)  
x South Asian 0.295 (0.022) *** 0.096 (0.015) *** 0.164 (0.022) *** -0.091 (0.015) *** 
x Pupil Premium -0.235 (0.023) *** -0.269 (0.016) *** -0.307 (0.015) *** -0.277 (0.016) *** 
x PP & black 0.075 (0.032) * 0.072 (0.029) * 0.154 (0.048) ** 0.040 (0.068)  
x PP & other 0.102 (0.034) ** 0.085 (0.035) * 0.194 (0.045) *** -0.033 (0.060)  
x PP & South Asian 0.086 (0.037) * 0.013 (0.022)  0.077 (0.033) * 0.079 (0.025) ** 
x KS2: High 0.505 (0.019) *** 0.341 (0.013) *** 0.259 (0.015) *** 0.295 (0.014) *** 
x KS2: Low -0.212 (0.013) *** -0.213 (0.011) *** -0.149 (0.014) *** -0.111 (0.013) *** 
Distance (km)                         
 -0.537 (0.018) *** -0.445 (0.017) *** -0.547 (0.016) *** -0.521 (0.016) *** 
x black 0.136 (0.021) *** 0.125 (0.023) *** 0.060 (0.034)  -0.033 (0.049)  
x other 0.060 (0.023) ** 0.138 (0.027) *** 0.140 (0.032) *** -0.028 (0.042)  
x South Asian 0.240 (0.020) *** 0.237 (0.017) *** 0.145 (0.024) *** 0.014 (0.020)  
x Pupil Premium -0.051 (0.017) ** -0.078 (0.017) *** -0.136 (0.021) *** -0.087 (0.020) *** 
x KS2: High 0.248 (0.018) *** 0.073 (0.017) *** 0.099 (0.020) *** 0.133 (0.020) *** 
x KS2: Low -0.111 (0.020) *** -0.124 (0.020) *** -0.043 (0.022)  -0.031 (0.021)  
log(Distance)                         
 -0.675 (0.043) *** -1.139 (0.044) *** -0.605 (0.042) *** -0.605 (0.043) *** 
x black 0.057 (0.053)  0.176 (0.061) ** 0.200 (0.089) * 0.135 (0.121)  
x other -0.017 (0.055)  0.005 (0.074)  -0.185 (0.087) * 0.140 (0.109)  
x South Asian -0.594 (0.051) *** -0.256 (0.045) *** -0.240 (0.065) *** -0.211 (0.052) *** 
x Pupil Premium -0.051 (0.041)  0.029 (0.042)  0.115 (0.051) * 0.009 (0.051)  
x KS2: High -0.321 (0.055) *** 0.013 (0.051)  -0.188 (0.056) *** -0.172 (0.058) ** 
x KS2: Low 0.085 (0.044)  0.122 (0.049) * -0.063 (0.054)  -0.024 (0.053)  
Ofsted x local deprivation (IMD) fixed effects                     
Ofsted: Outst'g & IMD: Hi -0.011 (0.036)  0.067 (0.033) * 0.529 (0.055) *** 0.129 (0.057) * 
Ofsted: Outs'ng & IMD: Mid -0.017 (0.031)  0.302 (0.032) *** 0.283 (0.029) *** 0.229 (0.030) *** 
Ofsted: Outs'ng & IMD: Lo 0.279 (0.043) *** 0.606 (0.039) *** -0.008 (0.039)  -0.406 (0.047) *** 
Ofsted: Good & IMD: Hi -0.367 (0.034) *** -0.269 (0.030) *** -0.222 (0.032) *** -0.501 (0.029) *** 
Ofsted: Good & IMD: Mid1 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
Ofsted: Good & IMD: Lo 0.349 (0.045) *** 0.455 (0.041) *** 0.337 (0.032) *** 0.378 (0.032) *** 
Ofsted: < Good & IMD: Hi -0.600 (0.050) *** -0.641 (0.036) *** 0.084 (0.036) * -0.772 (0.032) *** 
Ofsted: < Good & IMD: Mid -0.350 (0.051) *** -0.191 (0.032) *** -0.027 (0.026)  -0.358 (0.027) *** 
Ofsted: < Good & IMD: Lo -0.281 (0.105) ** 0.025 (0.070)  0.315 (0.057) *** 0.088 (0.061)  
Faith school fixed effects                         
Faith: Church of England -0.077 (0.031) * -0.006 (0.039)  -0.145 (0.029) *** -0.323 (0.030) *** 
Faith: Roman Catholic -0.089 (0.027) *** 0.056 (0.026) * -0.037 (0.022)   -0.077 (0.024) ** 
# Pupils 21,890 2  28,373   25,891   23,363   
# Schools 435   175   157   150   
Pseudo R-squared 0.439     0.520     0.526     0.553     





Table 9: Estimates of model B for all locations 
  London     Birmingham   Manchester   Pennines     
Coefficient Est. St. Err.   Est. St. Err.   Est. St. Err.   Est. St. Err.   
AC5 predicted (10 points)                        
 0.270 (0.017) *** 0.291 (0.016) *** 0.329 (0.015) *** 0.260 (0.014) *** 
x black 0.252 (0.025) *** 0.058 (0.026) * 0.216 (0.044) *** 0.109 (0.053) * 
x other 0.167 (0.027) *** -0.037 (0.030)  0.058 (0.032)  0.016 (0.038)  
x South Asian 0.284 (0.026) *** 0.070 (0.018) *** 0.181 (0.025) *** -0.119 (0.016) *** 
x Pupil Premium -0.331 (0.031) *** -0.352 (0.021) *** -0.319 (0.020) *** -0.280 (0.018) *** 
x PP & black 0.145 (0.040) *** 0.135 (0.034) *** 0.176 (0.057) ** 0.060 (0.074)  
x PP & other 0.175 (0.042) *** 0.121 (0.041) ** 0.172 (0.054) ** -0.033 (0.068)  
x PP & South Asian 0.174 (0.046) *** 0.081 (0.027) ** 0.059 (0.040)  0.046 (0.029)  
x KS2: High 0.556 (0.020) *** 0.373 (0.013) *** 0.331 (0.017) *** 0.325 (0.015) *** 
x KS2: Low -0.279 (0.016) *** -0.274 (0.013) *** -0.181 (0.017) *** -0.143 (0.014) *** 
AC5 residual                        
 0.159 (0.026) *** 0.194 (0.021) *** 0.401 (0.024) *** 0.227 (0.026) *** 
x black 0.212 (0.038) *** 0.058 (0.040)  0.255 (0.079) ** -0.147 (0.112)  
x other 0.085 (0.037) * -0.116 (0.043) ** -0.031 (0.063)  0.087 (0.079)  
x South Asian 0.317 (0.039) *** 0.066 (0.027) * 0.095 (0.046) * 0.029 (0.031)  
x Pupil Premium -0.093 (0.040) * -0.172 (0.025) *** -0.301 (0.029) *** -0.257 (0.033) *** 
x PP & black 0.009 (0.054)  0.055 (0.051)  0.105 (0.099)  0.042 (0.146)  
x PP & other 0.055 (0.057)  0.185 (0.063) ** 0.327 (0.100) ** -0.065 (0.118)  
x PP & South Asian -0.013 (0.061)  0.037 (0.040)  0.182 (0.070) ** 0.109 (0.049) * 
x KS2: High 0.083 (0.036) * 0.000 (0.023)  0.024 (0.030)  0.068 (0.033) * 
x KS2: Low -0.088 (0.021) *** -0.097 (0.019) *** -0.091 (0.026) *** -0.027 (0.026)  
Distance (km)                        
 -0.539 (0.018) *** -0.443 (0.017) *** -0.546 (0.016) *** -0.522 (0.016) *** 
x black 0.133 (0.022) *** 0.122 (0.023) *** 0.058 (0.034)  -0.031 (0.049)  
x other 0.056 (0.023) * 0.135 (0.027) *** 0.137 (0.032) *** -0.031 (0.042)  
x South Asian 0.241 (0.021) *** 0.231 (0.017) *** 0.144 (0.024) *** 0.015 (0.020)  
x Pupil Premium -0.049 (0.017) ** -0.078 (0.017) *** -0.136 (0.021) *** -0.086 (0.020) *** 
x KS2: High 0.231 (0.018) *** 0.077 (0.017) *** 0.094 (0.021) *** 0.134 (0.020) *** 
x KS2: Low -0.102 (0.020) *** -0.124 (0.020) *** -0.041 (0.022)  -0.033 (0.021)  
log(Distance)                         
 -0.673 (0.043) *** -1.142 (0.044) *** -0.608 (0.042) *** -0.605 (0.044) *** 
x black 0.048 (0.053)  0.166 (0.061) ** 0.199 (0.089) * 0.111 (0.121)  
x other -0.021 (0.055)  0.005 (0.075)  -0.180 (0.087) * 0.145 (0.109)  
x South Asian -0.601 (0.052) *** -0.258 (0.045) *** -0.245 (0.065) *** -0.219 (0.052) *** 
x Pupil Premium -0.043 (0.041)  0.044 (0.042)  0.119 (0.051) * 0.009 (0.051)  
x KS2: High -0.323 (0.055) *** -0.031 (0.051)  -0.189 (0.056) *** -0.165 (0.058) ** 
x KS2: Low 0.082 (0.044)  0.136 (0.049) ** -0.060 (0.054)  -0.019 (0.053)  
Ofsted x local deprivation fixed effects                       
Ofsted: Outs'ng & IMD: Hi 0.059 (0.038)  0.044 (0.034)  0.530 (0.056) *** 0.108 (0.057)  
Ofsted: Outs'ng & IMD: Mid 0.003 (0.031)  0.269 (0.032) *** 0.289 (0.030) *** 0.256 (0.030) *** 
Ofsted: Outs'ng & IMD: Lo 0.281 (0.044) *** 0.651 (0.039) *** -0.010 (0.039)  -0.390 (0.050) *** 
Ofsted: Good & IMD: Hi -0.346 (0.035) *** -0.272 (0.031) *** -0.242 (0.033) *** -0.544 (0.030) *** 
Ofsted: Good & IMD: Mid1 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
Ofsted: Good & IMD: Lo 0.325 (0.045) *** 0.461 (0.041) *** 0.348 (0.032) *** 0.391 (0.033) *** 
Ofsted: < Good & IMD: Hi -0.588 (0.050) *** -0.654 (0.037) *** 0.083 (0.036) * -0.801 (0.032) *** 
Ofsted: < Good & IMD: Mid -0.373 (0.051) *** -0.207 (0.032) *** -0.026 (0.026)  -0.365 (0.028) *** 
Ofsted: < Good & IMD: Lo -0.361 (0.105) *** 0.047 (0.071)  0.315 (0.057) *** 0.110 (0.062)  
Faith school fixed effects                         
Faith: Church of England -0.091 (0.031) ** -0.053 (0.040)  -0.132 (0.030) *** -0.328 (0.030) *** 
Faith: Roman Catholic -0.080 (0.027) ** 0.022 (0.026)   -0.030 (0.022)   -0.072 (0.024) ** 
# Pupils 21,890 2  28,373   25,891   23,363   
# Schools 435   175   157   150   
Pseudo R-squared 0.441     0.523     0.527     0.554     
1 Coefficient is fixed at zero. 2 A random sample was taken from London's cohort of 78,000. Key: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001  
Appendix 2: Willingness to Travel by location 
 
Figure 7: WTT for London: AC5; AC5_predicted; AC5_residual 

















































































Marginal Rates of Substitution evaluated at 2.5km for London:
 Comparison of AC5 to decomposition
Distance (km) that families would trade for 10 point increase in variable
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Figure 8: WTT for Birmingham: AC5; AC5_predicted; AC5_residual 

















































































Marginal Rates of Substitution evaluated at 2.5km for Birmingham:
 Comparison of AC5 to decomposition
Distance (km) that families would trade for 10 point increase in variable
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Figure 9: WTT for Manchester: AC5; AC5_predicted; AC5_residual 

















































































Marginal Rates of Substitution evaluated at 2.5km for Manchester:
 Comparison of AC5 to decomposition
Distance (km) that families would trade for 10 point increase in variable
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Figure 10: WTT for Pennines: AC5; AC5_predicted; AC5_residual 

















































































Marginal Rates of Substitution evaluated at 2.5km for Pennines:
 Comparison of AC5 to decomposition
Distance (km) that families would trade for 10 point increase in variable
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Figure 11: WTT on AC5 for all locations




















































































Marginal Rates of Substitution evaluated at 2.5km
Distance (km) that families would trade for 10 point increase in % 5+ A*-C  
Appendix 3: Admission results by radius and location 
Table 10: Estimates of case-control logit for London 
  Radius: 200m Radius: 500m Radius: 1000m 
Coefficient Est. St. Err.   Est. St. Err.   Est. St. Err.   
KS2: High -0.291 (0.152)  -0.390 (0.096) *** -0.233 (0.080) ** 
KS2: Low 0.198 (0.102)  0.229 (0.069) *** 0.196 (0.060) ** 
Pupil Premium 0.426 (0.099) *** 0.535 (0.066) *** 0.509 (0.057) *** 
black 0.839 (0.144) *** 0.756 (0.094) *** 0.779 (0.078) *** 
S. Asian 1.191 (0.176) *** 1.250 (0.113) *** 1.202 (0.095) *** 
other ethnicity 0.860 (0.146) *** 0.728 (0.095) *** 0.657 (0.078) *** 
SEN no st’mnt 0.132 (0.117)  0.052 (0.078)  0.098 (0.067)  
x Autonomous                   
KS2: High 0.044 (0.183)  0.006 (0.132)  -0.119 (0.116)  
KS2: Low -0.033 (0.127)  -0.096 (0.096)  -0.040 (0.089)  
Pupil Premium -0.416 (0.124) *** -0.519 (0.094) *** -0.324 (0.085) *** 
black -0.534 (0.179) ** -0.385 (0.131) ** -0.401 (0.119) *** 
S. Asian -0.935 (0.213) *** -1.001 (0.150) *** -0.785 (0.135) *** 
other ethnicity -0.561 (0.180) ** -0.441 (0.131) *** -0.419 (0.116) *** 
SEN no st’mnt -0.082 (0.148)  0.068 (0.111)  0.030 (0.102)  
x Community                   
KS2: High 0.340 (0.255)  0.648 (0.205) ** 0.250 (0.225)  
KS2: Low -0.095 (0.183)  -0.153 (0.142)  -0.014 (0.153)  
Pupil Premium -0.580 (0.175) *** -0.564 (0.137) *** -0.607 (0.146) *** 
black -0.549 (0.271) * -0.352 (0.203)  -0.627 (0.214) ** 
S. Asian -0.969 (0.290) *** -0.839 (0.225) *** -0.810 (0.246) *** 
other ethnicity -0.470 (0.261)  -0.338 (0.201)  -0.516 (0.233) * 
SEN no st’mnt -0.058 (0.201)  0.036 (0.160)  0.054 (0.173)  
# Pupils 8,442     14,997     18,625     
ow. Cases 3,938   6,620   7,844   
ow. Controls 4,504   8,377   10,781   
# Schools 258     247     218     






Table 11: Estimates of case-control logit for Manchester & Birmingham 
  Radius: 200m Radius: 500m Radius: 1000m 
Coefficient Est. St. Err.   Est. St. Err.   Est. St. Err.   
KS2: High 0.132 (0.161)  0.124 (0.117)  0.017 (0.099)  
KS2: Low 0.130 (0.156)  0.204 (0.110)  0.186 (0.095)  
Pupil Premium 0.780 (0.148) *** 0.750 (0.100) *** 0.789 (0.087) *** 
black 0.448 (0.203) * 0.595 (0.135) *** 0.808 (0.123) *** 
S. Asian 0.899 (0.217) *** 1.193 (0.152) *** 1.427 (0.133) *** 
other ethnicity 0.668 (0.242) ** 0.716 (0.165) *** 0.884 (0.138) *** 
SEN no st’mnt 0.466 (0.177) ** 0.255 (0.124) * 0.172 (0.111)  
x Autonomous                   
KS2: High -0.088 (0.221)  -0.050 (0.161)  -0.058 (0.147)  
KS2: Low 0.119 (0.200)  -0.070 (0.147)  -0.065 (0.135)  
Pupil Premium -0.568 (0.188) ** -0.595 (0.134) *** -0.656 (0.123) *** 
black -0.581 (0.283) * -0.540 (0.202) ** -0.579 (0.189) ** 
S. Asian -0.627 (0.276) * -0.949 (0.196) *** -1.329 (0.183) *** 
other ethnicity -0.733 (0.340) * -0.528 (0.243) * -0.679 (0.223) ** 
SEN no st’mnt -0.248 (0.229)  -0.130 (0.171)  -0.112 (0.156)  
x Community                   
KS2: High -0.712 (0.304) * -0.381 (0.268)  -0.407 (0.278)  
KS2: Low -0.568 (0.294)  -0.608 (0.255) * -0.548 (0.262) * 
Pupil Premium -1.003 (0.266) *** -0.758 (0.228) *** -0.753 (0.254) ** 
black -0.193 (0.508)  0.094 (0.401)  -0.149 (0.453)  
S. Asian -0.793 (0.477)  -1.345 (0.341) *** -1.582 (0.339) *** 
other ethnicity -0.431 (0.580)  -0.639 (0.433)  -1.010 (0.469) * 
SEN no st’mnt -0.424 (0.332)  -0.482 (0.290)  -0.873 (0.326) ** 
# Pupils 3,735     7,152     9,078     
ow. Cases 1,621   2,784   3,156   
ow. Controls 2,114   4,368   5,922   
# Schools 158     165     152     





Figure 12: Estimated coefficients from the matched logit model of non-admission for London. 
Comparison of matching radii. 
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Figure 13: Estimated coefficients from the matched logit model of non-admission for Manchester & 
Birmingham. Comparison of matching radii. 
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Appendix 4: The multinomial logit discrete choice model  
As described in section 5.1, the association between observed characteristics of families 
and schools, and the probability of a particular family choosing a school can be modelled 
by invoking a latent continuous variable that is usually known as utility. 
The utility of a family 𝑖𝑖 for a school 𝑗𝑗 can be written as 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑣𝑣�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖;𝛽𝛽� +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where the regression function 𝑣𝑣(∙) represents the part of utility that is predictable from 
observed characteristics 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 and 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 with coefficients 𝛽𝛽. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the idiosyncratic random 
term. The model is fitted to data by estimating the coefficients 𝛽𝛽. 
The form of the model depends on the random element, which is assumed to follow a 
particular distribution. If the random element is assumed to follow a Gumbel distribution, 
then the resulting model is the multinomial logit model, and the regression model 𝑣𝑣(∙) is 
transformed into a model of the probability of choice by 
𝑃𝑃(𝑖𝑖 chooses 𝑗𝑗) =  𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗;𝛽𝛽�
∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑍𝑍ℎ;𝛽𝛽�𝐽𝐽ℎ=1  . 
The coefficients, 𝛽𝛽, of this model can be estimated using maximum likelihood methods. 
In the study two models for the utility prediction function 𝑣𝑣(∙)  are specified and estimated. 
The first model is specified as 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 log𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5𝑖𝑖 + 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖�𝛽𝛽4𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5 log𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5𝑖𝑖�+ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖�𝛽𝛽7𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8 log𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5𝑖𝑖�+ 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖�𝛽𝛽10𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽11 log𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽12𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5𝑖𝑖�+ 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖�𝛽𝛽13𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽14 log𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽15𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5𝑖𝑖�+ 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾2𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖�𝛽𝛽16𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽17 log𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽18𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5𝑖𝑖�+ 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾2ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝛽𝛽19𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽20 log𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽21𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5𝑖𝑖�+ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5𝑖𝑖(𝛽𝛽22𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽23𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽24𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) + ��𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘3
𝑘𝑘=1
3
𝑘𝑘=1+ 𝛽𝛽25𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽26𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  . 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖~Gumbel . 
In this notation, each of the ethnic and KS2 groups, and Pupil Premium, have an 
indicator variable which takes a value of zero if pupil 𝑖𝑖 does not belong to that group, and 
one if she does. These indicator variables mean that certain parts of the model are only 
relevant to certain groups. For example, coefficients 𝛽𝛽4 to 𝛽𝛽6 only apply to pupils eligible 
for Pupil Premium, otherwise that part of the model is zero. The variable 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes 
distance, in km, and log denotes the natural logarithm.  
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The second model is specified as 




+ 𝛽𝛽36𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽37𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  . 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖~Gumbel . 
Willingness to Travel 
The Willingness to Travel for academic performance, otherwise known as the marginal 
rate of substitution, can be interpreted as the infinitesimal increase in distance to a school 
that would exactly compensate for an infinitesimal improvement in test scores, leaving a 
family’s probability of choosing a school unchanged. It also serves as a linear 
approximation to the increase in distance that a parent will be “willing” (in the economic 
sense described above) to exchange for a unit improvement in performance. Since, in 
the model, AC5 is measured in units equivalent to 10 percentage points, 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5,𝑑𝑑 
therefore approximately measures the distance, in km, that a parent will travel for a 10 
point improvement in AC5. 
The Willingness to Travel is estimated by 
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5,𝑑𝑑 = 𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5⁄𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈 𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑⁄ = ?̂?𝛽(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5)?̂?𝛽(𝑑𝑑) + 1𝑑𝑑 ?̂?𝛽(log𝑑𝑑) . 
In the above expression, the estimated composite coefficients aggregate the model 
coefficients that are relevant for the demographic characteristics of the pupil. For 
example, in the first model above, ?̂?𝛽(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5) for a South Asian, Pupil Premium pupil would be 
constructed as ?̂?𝛽3 + ?̂?𝛽6 + ?̂?𝛽12 + ?̂?𝛽23. Standard errors are constructed using the delta 
method, ignoring covariance terms. 
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Appendix 5: The conditional logit case-control model 
In the case-control matched analysis of rejection, we wish to model the probability of non-
admission to different types of school as a function of pupil characteristics: ability; 
disadvantage; ethnic group; and SEN status. Matching on location removes the important 
influence of residential location on school access probabilities, but it also distorts the 
proportions of admitted and unadmitted pupils in the sample. For example, using a one-
to-one case-control design would fix the overall probability of non-admission in the 
sample to 0.5. The conditional logit model accounts for the matched sampling by treating 
each matched pair (or group, in the case of many-to-one matches) as a self-contained 
sub-sample or stratum, and modelling the probability of non-admission for each child 
within each stratum, conditional upon the fixed admission rate in the stratum. 
The observed characteristics of child 𝑖𝑖 are related to the probability of not being admitted 
by a regression function or linear predictor, 
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 = �𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝐾𝐾
𝑏𝑏=1 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏 , 
where 𝛾𝛾 are the coefficients to be estimated , and 𝑏𝑏 indexes the different observed pupil 
characteristics, 𝑥𝑥. The conditional logit probability depends on the number of cases and 
controls in each stratum. In a one-to-many design where, within each stratum t, one case 
is matched to 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜 − 1 controls, the probability is 
𝑃𝑃(𝑖𝑖 is not admitted in stratum 𝑜𝑜) =  𝑒𝑒𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑒𝑒𝜂𝜂ℎ𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡ℎ=1
 . 
In this case, the conditional logit model turns out to be mathematically identical to the 
multinomial logit discrete choice model. This makes sense: the discrete choice model 
represents the probability of choice of one school from a fixed number of options; 
whereas the case-control model represents the probability of “rejection” of one child, 
given a fixed number of children in the stratum. The many-to-one design, where 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜 − 1 
cases are matched to one control, is similar, but the denominator is a more complex 
expression that is calculated iteratively. 
The method presented in this report allows both many-to-one and one-to-many 
matchings. Many-to-many matched designs, although possible, are more computationally 
demanding to estimate so are not used in the study. 
The regression function used in the analysis includes indicator variables for child 
characteristics, and interacts these with indicators of school type, to estimate separate 
rejection probabilities for the three school types: 
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𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾1𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾2ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾2𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾4𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾5𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾6𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾7𝐾𝐾𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖+  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖�𝛾𝛾8𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾2ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾9𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾2𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾10𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾11𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾12𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖+ 𝛾𝛾13𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾14𝐾𝐾𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖�+ 𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖�𝛾𝛾15𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾2ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾16𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾2𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾17𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾18𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾19𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖+ 𝛾𝛾20𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾21𝐾𝐾𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖�  . 
Interpretation of coefficients 
To ease interpretation of the estimated coefficients, 𝛾𝛾� they are transformed into a 
particular type of non-admission probability. To motivate this transformation, we consider 
a hypothetical adversarial situation where two children are assessed for the last 
remaining seat at a school. One of the children possesses the characteristic relating to 
the coefficient (say, Pupil Premium). We call this the child of interest. The other child has 
none of the characteristics and is therefore white, medium KS2, non-Pupil Premium and 
without Special Educational Needs. We call this the baseline child. The probability that 
the child of interest is not admitted, while the baseline child is admitted in this 
hypothetical situation is given by 
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